We study a game theoretic model where a coalition of processors might collude to bias the outcome of the protocol, where we assume that the processors always prefer any legitimate outcome over a non-legitimate one. We show that the problems of Fair
INTRODUCTION
One of the most fundamental tasks in distributed computing is fault tolerance, the ability to overcome malicious or abnormal behavior of processors. Fault tolerance is essential to make distributed systems viable, and enables them to operate at large scale and in unsecured environments. Different models of fault tolerance assume different assumptions about faulty processors. For example, some model assume that faulty processors are Byzantine, i.e., they can behave in an arbitrary malicious way. As another example, some models assume that faulty processors are fail-stop, i.e., they execute the protocol normally until an arbitrary point and then they stop responding. In both cases, the only objective of faulty processors is to fail the protocol.
In this paper, we study protocols that are tolerant to a third type of faulty processors, rational agents. We assume the processors are selfish. Given a protocol, each processor (which is a rational agent) has its own utility function over the possible outcomes of the protocol. A processor deviates from the protocol (i.e., cheats by running another protocol) if deviating increases its expected utility.
Later, we explain what reasonable assumptions can be made about the processors' utility functions.
At a high level we would like to design protocols which are resilient to such deviations. This line of research has been active for over a decade (see, [1, 2, 4-6, 13, 19, 22] ).
Following this research, we look for solutions (i.e., resilient protocols) in terms of game-theory. Specifically, we look for a protocol that is a strong-k-Nash-equilibria. That is, a protocol for which there is no coalition (any subset of the processors) of up to k processors, that can increase the expected utility of each of its members by deviating cooperatively. Where deviating cooperatively means running another protocol instead of the prescribed protocol. As in strong-k-Nash-equilibria, such a coalition assumes that all of the processors outside the coalition play honestly, i.e., execute the protocol honestly. In other words, two coalitions cannot deviate in parallel. If a protocol is a strong-k-Nash-equilibria for every set of utility functions, then we ssay it is k-resilient.
We explain and motivate our setting using an example. Consider the problem of designing a leader election protocol for rational agents. The main issue is that some processors might want to get elected as a leader in order to gain additional privileges. A natural solution would be a Fair Leader Election protocol, which is a leader election protocol that elects each processor with equal probability. One simple protocol, assuming that the n ids of the processors are [1, n] , is to let each processor select a random value in [n] and broadcast it. Each processor, after receiving all the random values, can sum the values up (modulus n) and the result would be the id of the elected leader. This simple protocol selects a leader uniformly, assuming all the processors follow it precisely. However, in an asynchronous network even a single deviating processor can control the output and select the leader. A single processor can cheat by waiting for the random values of all the other processors to arrive before selecting its own value. Note that this simple protocol is applicable also in message-passing networks, because one can implement broadcast over the network.
The weakness of that simple protocol was already observed by Abraham et al. [4] , who suggested a methodology to overcome it in a unidirectional ring network. They named their protocol A-LEAD uni . The main idea in A-LEAD uni is to use buffering in order to delay the flow of the messages along the ring and thus limit the effect of malicious processors. They showed that A-LEAD uni is a strong-1-Nash-equilibria, thus, is overcoming a single malicious processor. They claimed that their protocol is ( n 2 − 1)-resilient, i.e., resilient to every coalition of size k ≤ 1 2 n − 1, however, it is true only for coalitions that are located consecutively along the ring.
Later, Afek et al. [5] simplified A-LEAD uni , and decomposed it into useful intuitive building blocks.
The main thrust of this paper is studying the resilience of A-LEAD uni and improving it.
In our model, we assume the solution preference assumption, i.e., that processors always prefer a selection of any leader over a failure of the protocol. This assumption is reasonable in various settings. For example, processors might be able to cheat only during the leader election, which is usually a preliminary step, but not during the main computation. In such case, leaving the system in an erroneous state at the termination of the leader election step, fails also the main computation and thus prevents them from benefiting from its results.
The solution preference assumption has two benefits. First, we can hope for non-trivial resilience results. In a unidirectional ring, two processors can disconnect the ring and thus fail every reasonable protocol, however due to the solution preference, a failure is the worst possible outcome in terms of utility, so they want to avoid it. Therefore, we can still hope for k-resilient protocols with k > 2. Second, the solution preference assumption allows processors to "punish" deviating processors. If a processor detects a deviation, then it aborts the protocol by terminating with an invalid output and therefore no processor gets elected. Since all processors know this threatening behavior, a coalition wishes to bias the output by deviating from the protocol without getting detected.
In our setting, malicious processors would like to bias the leader election as much as possible. Our main notion of resilience measures how much the malicious processors can influence the outcome of the leader election. At a high level, in our attacks, the malicious processors almost determine the elected processor. In our resilience results, we prove that the malicious processors might be able to increase the probability of a processor to get elected only by a negligible amount.
Our Contributions: Our primary focus is to find a function k = k (n) as large as possible, such that there exists a k-resilient leader election protocol for an asynchronous unidirectional ring. From the other direction, while considering other topologies of asynchronous networks, we want to find a function k = k (n) as small as possible, such that there does not exist a k-resilient fair leader election protocol. In-existence of a k-resilient protocol is called an impossibility claim.
Abraham et al. [4] presented a uniform leader election protocol for a unidirectional ring, named A-LEAD uni , and showed that it is resilient to coalitions of size k < 1 2 n that are located consecutively along the ring (for completeness, we also give a resilience proof of this result in the full paper [28] ). For a general asynchronous network, in particular for a unidirectional ring, Abraham et al. showed that there is no k-resilient protocol for every k ≥ 1 2 n. Our main contributions are:
• We give an almost tight resilience analysis for A-LEAD uni , for generally located coalitions. First, we show that it is not resilient to a randomly located coalition of size k = Θ( n log(n)) with high probability (in the full paper). Then, we also show that this protocol is not resilient to k = 2 3 √ n carefully located (i.e., worst case) processors (Section 4). Next, we prove that A-LEAD uni is k-resilient for k = O ( 4 √ n) (Section 5).
• We improve A-LEAD uni by introducing a new protocol
PhaseAsyncLead , a Θ( √ n)-resilient fair leader election protocol for a unidirectional ring. We exhibit both an attack with Θ( √ n) malicious processors, and prove that PhaseAsyncLead
We generalize a previous impossibility result from [4] , by
showing that there is no k-resilient fair leader election protocol for every asynchronous k-simulated tree. A k-simulated tree is a network that can be simulated by a tree network, where each processor in the tree simulates at most k processors. This generalizes the previous impossibility result because any graph is a ⌈ 1 2 n⌉-simulated tree. Also, it strictly improves the previous result because some graphs are ksimulated trees for k ≪ 1 2 n (for example, trees are 1-simulated trees).
• Unsurprisingly, we show that Fair Coin Toss and Fair Leader Election are equivalent. Essentially, Fair Coin Toss requires the ability to toss a fair binary coin, while fair leader election requires the ability to toss log 2 (n) binary coins. In order to implement leader election using loд(n) coin tosses, we assume the ability to run independent coin tosses. We include the details only in the full paper.
Our Techniques: The main idea in our attacks on A-LEAD uni is rushing the information. Namely, the attacking processors reduce the number of messages traversing the ring by not generating their own random value. This allows them to acquire quickly all the information that is required to influence the outcome of the protocol. The main observation in our resilience proof for A-LEAD uni is that all of the processors must be "k 2 -synchronized" during the execution, or else a deviation is detected by the honest processors which abort. In this context, "m-synchronized" means that at every point in time during the execution, every two processors have sent the same number of messages up to a difference of O (m).
Another observation used for our resilience proof for A-LEAD uni is that the information required for a processor p in the coalition in order to bias the output is initially located far away. If the coalition is small enough, then by the time the information reaches p, it is already too late for it to bias the output. This is because p is committed to what it will send in the future, because the honest processors validate the contents of all its future messages (honest processors abort if p does not send the expected messages). For this reason p cannot manipulate the output calculated by its honest successor, so in particular the coalition cannot bias the outcome.
Our main idea in the design of PhaseAsyncLead is forcing processors to be more synchronized, specifically, "k -synchronized" instead of "k 2 -synchronized". As a side effect of the synchronization enforcement in our improved protocol, small amounts of information might travel quickly, so the technique used for the previous resilience proof does not apply (as required far away information can now travel quickly). In order to cope with that problem, we use a random function that forces any malicious processor to obtain a lot of information before being able to bias the output. We show that due to "k-synchronization", in order to get that amount of information, a processor must send a lot of messages. However, by the time it sends so many messages, it has already committed to all of its outgoing messages that might affect the output (i.e., all of its future messages that might affect the output are validated by other processors as before).
Related Work: Most of our work focuses the fundamental problem of leader election on a ring. Standard algorithms, which are not fault tolerant were studied in [12, 16, 24] . These classical works, elect the processor with the maximal (or minimal) id as the leader.
Fault tolerance in distributed systems under classic assumptions of Byzantine faults and fail-stop faults has been studied extensively. For examples refer to the following surveys [14, 27] . Fault models that combine both Byzantine, and rational processors, where studied in [2, 3, 7, 22] .
There is a variety of game-theoretic approaches to distributed computing. A discussion about the basic definitions and a brief survey can be found in [1] . A well studied problem in the intersection of game-theoretic and distributed computing is secret sharing and multi-party computation [2, 15, [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] . Recall that our main procedure is a sub-protocol that performs secret sharing.
Fair leader election, fair coin toss and fair consensus (which is similar to fair coin toss) were explored in various models. For example, Afek et al. [6] study a variety of fairness problems in synchronous networks, Clement et al. [13] study fair consensus in the Gossip model, and finally, maybe the most studied problem is coin-toss in the synchronous full-information model [8-11, 25, 26, 29] . Our usage of a non-constructive random function in PhaseAsyncLead is inspired by the randomized non-constructive approach suggested by [9] .
MODEL
We use an asynchronous version of the LOCAL computation model (see, [23] ). That is, the processors are nodes on a communication graph G = (V , E) and they communicate by sending messages of unlimited size along the edges. Messages are guaranteed to arrive uncorrupted in a FIFO order. Processors are allowed to perform computations and send messages only upon wake up, or upon receiving a message. Additionally, each processor may perform local randomization. Equivalently, each processor has an infinite random string as input and it operates deterministically. Each processor has a unique id which it cannot modify. The set of ids, V , is known to the processors, therefore w.l.o.g we may assume that V = [n] := {1, . . . , n}. When a processor receives a message, it may send zero or more messages and afterwards it may also select some output and terminate. The output may be any value, including ⊥ which denotes abort. The messages are delivered asynchronously along the links by some oblivious message schedule which does not depend on the messages' values.
A strategy of a processor is a (deterministic) function that defines its behavior. Upon waking-up or receiving an incoming message, the strategy decides what messages to send and whether or not to terminate. The decision is based on everything known to the processor until that time: Its id, its random string and its history (all the messages it has received). A protocol is a vector of n strategies -a strategy for each processor in V . A symmetric protocol, is a protocol that provides the same strategy to all the processors. In game-theoretic terms, the processors are the players and a protocol is a strategy profile.
Given an execution e of a protocol, define outcome (e) = o (for some o ∈ V ) if all processors terminate with output = o. We call such an outcome o ∈ V , valid. Otherwise, if either some processor never terminates, or some processor i terminates with output i = ⊥, or some processors i and j terminate with output i output j , then we have outcome (e) = FAIL. Notice that the output of each processor is determined locally, while the outcome of an execution is a function of all the individual outputs so is therefore determined globally.
The solution preference assumption might seem problematic due to this definition of outcome. At first glance, one might think that a cheater could "force" all processors to agree on its preferred outcome by always terminating with its most preferred output. If all players know this behavior, since they prefer any valid outcome over a failure, then they will aline with the cheater. However, it is not the case because the strategy of each honest (non-cheating) agent is predetermined. That is, the agents do not have any sidechannel to discuss threats. As a motivating reasoning, the technician installs the program on each computer and it is never modified.
A fair leader election (FLE) protocol P elects a leader uniformly. Formally, P is a symmetric protocol that assigns a strategy S to every processor such that for every message schedule
where the probability is over the local randomization of the processors.
In order to define a game, we assume that each processor maximizes their expected utility, which is only a function of the outcome. More, we assume that each processor is rational, i.e., it has a higher utility for valid outcomes. Formally,
The motivation for the definition is that each processor, including the deviating processors, would prefer any legitimate outcome (in V ) over any other outcome (which will result in FAIL), i.e., we assume the solution preference assumption. Notice that any processor can force outcome (e) = FAIL by aborting (terminating 
then whenever p sees that the output is going to be i, it would simply abort instead. Intuitively, processors would like to promote their preferred leader while having the protocol succeed. We start by defining a deviation of a coalition.
Definition 2.2. (Adversarial Deviation) Let P be a symmetric protocol that assigns the strategy S to every processor. Let C ⊂ V be a subset of k processors. An adversarial deviation of C from P is a protocol P ′ , in which every processor i C executes S and every processor i ∈ C executes an arbitrary strategy P ′ i . The processors in C are called adversaries and the processors not in C (i.e., in V \C) are called honest.
Concisely, a protocol is ϵ-k-resilient if no coalition of size k can increase the expected utility of each of its members by at least ϵ by an adversarial deviation (note that this is an ϵ-k-Strong Nash
for every oblivious messages schedule, for every rational utilities, for every coalition C of size k, and for every adversarial deviation D = (P V −C , P ′ C ) of the coalition C using P ′ , there exists p ∈ C such that,
For a unidirectional ring, which is the focus of this paper, all message schedules are equivalent because each processor has only one incoming FIFO link. For a general scenario, the above definition implies that the adversaries may choose any oblivious schedule. But the selection of the schedule may not depend on the inputs or on the processors' randomization.
To simplify the proofs, rather than considering the expected utility of each adversary, we consider the change in probabilities of valid outcomes. An FLE protocol P with is ϵ-k-unbiased if for every adversarial deviation D of size k:
The following lemma shows the equivalence of resilience and unbias.
Proof. Let P be an ϵ-k-resilient FLE protocol ans C be an adversarial coalition of size k. Assign the following rational utility to every processor p ∈ C we have u p (j) := 1 [j=j 0 ] and for p C we have u p (j) := 1 [j=p] . (We can select any utility for p C and the same proof holds.) Let D be an adversarial deviation from P for C. Then by resilience we get,
For the other direction, let P be an ϵ-k-unbiased FLE protocol. Fix a processor p and let u p be its rational utility. Let D be an adversarial deviation of size k. Since P is unbiased, we get ∀j ∈ [n] :
A RESILIENT FAIR LEADER ELECTION PROTOCOL FOR AN ASYNCHRONOUS UNIDIRECTIONAL RING
We present A-LEAD uni , the asynchronous unidirectional ring FLE protocol of [4, 5] . The protocol relies on a secret sharing sub-protocol. First, we describe the protocol without specifying the implementation of the secret sharing sub-protocol. Then we present its implementation. Each processor i, selects a secret d i ∈ [n] uniformly. Then, using a secret sharing sub-protocol, all processors share the secret values
with each other, such that each processor i gets the valueŝ
Then, each processor i validates locally thatd i,i = d i . Ifd i,i d i then it aborts by terminating with output i = ⊥. Finally, each processor i terminates with output i = n j=1d i, j (mod n). It remains to define the secret sharing sub-protocol. For didactic reasons, first consider the following non-resilient secret-sharing sub-protocol as in [4] : Each processor j sends its secret d j , and then forwards n − 1 messages (receives and sends immediately). If all processors execute this sub-protocol honestly, then each processor receives every secret exactly once. Using the scheme defined above with this secret sharing sub-protocol is not resilient even to a single adversary (a coalition of size k = 1). An adversary could wait to receive n − 1 values before sending its first message and then select its secret value to control the total sum n i=1 d i (mod n). (The pseudo-code can be found in the full paper.)
Ideally, we want every processor to "commit" to its secret value before knowing any other secret value. In order to force processors to "commit" to their values, the processors delay every incoming message for one round. W.l.o.g., define processor 1 to be the origin processor, and define it to be the only processor which wakes up spontaneously. Let the rest of the processors be normal processors. We specify different functionality for the origin processor and for the normal processors.
Algorithm: Secret sharing for A-LEAD uni , shares the values
1 Strategy for a normal processor i: Initially, store d i in a buffer.
For the following n incoming messages, upon receiving a new message m, send the value which is currently in the buffer and then store m in the buffer. 2 Strategy for origin: Initially (upon wake-up) send d 1 and then forward (receive and send immediately) n − 1 incoming messages.
The artificial delay in the secret sharing defined above forces every processor to give away its secret value before it gets to know the other secret values. Furthermore, this delay limits the communication of the adversaries. Two adversaries that are separated by l consecutive honest processors need to send l + 1 messages in order to transfer information. and a j+1 , a maximal set of consecutive honest processors is called an honest segment. Denote by I j ⊆ V the honest segment between a j and a j+1 , and let l j be its length. (See Figure 1. )
An adversary a i with non-trivial segment l i ≥ 1 is called an exposed adversary.
By the definition of outcome, an execution of an adversarial deviation from A-LEAD uni might have outcome = FAIL for three reasons. First, the execution might run forever because some exposed adversary sends less than n messages. Second, two honest processors might calculate different outputs. Third, an honest processor h might abort by terminating with output = ⊥ if its n t h incoming message is invalid, i.e.,d h,h d h . We characterize these reasons in the following lemma. (1) Every exposed adversary sends n messages.
(2) The sums of all the outgoing messages of the exposed adversaries, are identical modulo n. (3) For every adversary a j , its last l j messages are the secret values of the honest processors in I j , in the appropriate order.
Note that in order to bias the output, the adversaries do not necessarily need to send the same set of messages. They only need to comply to conditions 1 and 3 while controlling the sum of their outgoing messages (in addition to condition 2). In our attacks we show this is indeed possible. Note that condition 1 implies that every honest processor sends n messages and therefore all the honest processors terminate. Lemma 3.4. For every a j ∈ C, if the last l j outgoing messages of a j are the secret values of I j in the appropriate order, then the calculated sum of every processor in I j is the sum of the outgoing messages of a j .
Proof. Assume that the last l j messages of a j are the random values of I j in the appropriate order. Since I j is continuous, it is enough to show that every two consecutive processors in I j calculate the same sum. Let b, c be two consecutive processors in I j where c is the successor of b. Let [m 1 , m 2 , ..., m n ] be the incoming messages of b. Since b is honest, the incoming messages of c are [r, m 1 , ..., m n−1 ] where r is the random value of b. Since the last l j messages of a j are the random values of I j , the last message that b receives, m n , is its random value r . Therefore, b and c received the same list of messages up to a permutation, in particular their calculated sums in e are equal. □ Lemma 3.5. Let e be an execution of P. Let a j ∈ C. The last l j messages of a j are the random values of I j in the appropriate order, if and only if all the processors in I j pass validation.
Proof. Denote I j = (h 1 , h 2 , ..., h l j ) the honest processors along I j , denote (m l j , ..., m 2 , m 1 ) the last l j messages of a j in the order they are sent. The last message that h 1 receives is a j 's last outgoing message, m 1 . Since h 1 is honest, the last message that h 2 receives is m 2 etc. So every processor in I j receives its random value as the last message if and only if the last l j messages of a j are the random values of I j in the appropriate order. We conclude because a processor passes validation if and only if its last incoming message is its random value. □ (1) Every exposed adversary sends n messages.
Proof. (⇒)Let e be an execution of P. Assume that either 1 or 2 does not hold. If 1 does not hold, then let a i , a j be two such adversaries with different sum of outgoing messages S i , S j . Let b i , b j be their successors, they are honest because l i > 0 and l j > 0. So b i elects L[S i ] and b j elects L[S j ]. There are two different outputs, and therefore outcome = FAIL. If 2 does not hold, then one of the processors in I j fails validation by Lemma 3.5, it aborts and therefore outcome = FAIL.
(⇐)Let e be an execution of P. Assume that 1 and 2 hold. Since 2 holds, all processors pass validation, therefore they all output a valid value in [n] (output ⊥). So it is enough to show that all the honest processors calculate the same sum. Let h i ∈ I i , h j ∈ I j be two honest processors. Since 2 holds, from Lemma 3.4 the sum that h i calculates is the sum of outgoing messages of a i , similarly for h j . Since 1 holds, these two sums are equal, so h i and h j calculate the same sum. Therefore all the honest processor terminate with the same output. □
Remark.
Originally, in the model defined in [4] , the ids are unknown prior to the execution, so the protocol begins with a wake-up phase, in which processors exchange ids and select an orientation for the ring. Clearly, our attacks still hold for the original protocol, since the adversarial processors can behave honestly during this initial phase. We are unsure how to extend our resilience proofs to handle this case. The worry is that adversaries can abuse the wake-up phase in order to transfer information.
Remark. There exist general commitment schemes in other research areas, but they do not fit in our model. Since we assume unlimited computation power, generic computation-based cryptographic commitment schemes such as one-way functions are useless in our model. 
ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS ON A-LEAD uni
In this section we describe the adversarial attacks on A-LEAD uni . First, we show that a coalition of size k = √ n located at equal distances can control the outcome. Namely, for any w ∈ [n] they can force outcome = w. Second, we show that, with high probability, a coalition of O ( n log n) randomly located processors can control the outcome. Third, we show that an adversarially located coalition of size O ( 3 √ n) can also control the outcome.
The case of equally spaced coalition of size k = √ n follows from the following. Proof. We show that the adversaries can comply to conditions 1 and 3 of Lemma 3.3 while controlling the sum of outgoing messages of every adversary. The main idea is that adversaries never select a secret value for themselves. Moreover, instead of buffering every incoming message, the adversaries just forward every incoming message immediately. This way, after n − k rounds, every adversary sent only n − k messages and knows all the secret values of all the n − k honest processors.
Each adversary a j can control the sum of its outgoing messages while complying to conditions 1 and 3 of Lemma 3.3: It sends a message M (we explain later how to choose M), then it sends k−l j −1 times 0, and finally it sends its last l j secret value messages of the honest processors in I j , as expected. Since the total sum is Γ = i C d i + M + 0 · (k − l j − 1) + i ∈I j d i (mod n), adversary a j can control this sum by selecting M properly, i.e., for M = w − i C d i − i ∈I j d i (mod n) we have Γ = w. □ From the above lemma we deduce the following theorem.
Proof. Let C be a coalition of size k ≥ √ n located at equal distances along the ring (equal distances means |l i − l j | ≤ 1). Every honest segment I j , is of length l j < n−k k + 1 = n k ≤ √ n ≤ k. So, l j ≤ k − 1. Therefore the condition for Lemma 4.1 holds and the adversaries can control the outcome, i.e., Pr (outcome = 1) = 1 = 1 n + (1 − 1 n ). Therefore A-LEAD uni is not ϵ-k-unbiased for ϵ < 1 − 1 n , and, by Lemma 2.4, it is not ϵ-k-resilient for ϵ < 1 − 1 n . □ Notice that Lemma 4.1 requires only l j ≤ k − 1 for all j. Unsurprisingly, k = Θ( n log n) randomly located adversaries, with high probability, will comply to this requirement (an explicit calculation is included in the full paper). Therefore, A-LEAD uni is not resilient against k = Θ( n log n) randomly located adversaries. In the full paper we also show a similar attack for k = Θ( n log n) randomly located adversaries that do not even know their distances {l j } and the exact number of adversaries k.
Next, we improve the attack from Lemma 4.1 and show that k = Θ( 3 √ n) adversaries can control the outcome. The key observation from Lemma 4.1 is that the adversaries do not need to select a secret value for themselves so they can transfer the secret values of the honest processors faster than expected. Notice that when the adversaries do not send their values, they have k extra messages they are allowed to send. In the new attack, the adversaries leverage these extra messages to "push" information faster along the ring. Technically, we locate the k adversaries having the following distances l i = (k + 1 − i)(k − 1). For simplicity, one can think that
. However, we prove the attack works for general k and n such that k ≥ 2 3 √ n. We show that a coalition, with such distances, can control the output.
Algorithm: Cubic Attack, strategy for adversary a i , for electing w.
(1) Transfer (receive and send immediately) n − k − l i incoming messages. Denote with m j the j t h message that was received. (2) Send k − 1 messages with the value 0.
(3) Wait to receive l i more incoming messages, to get a total of n − k messages (only receive, do not send them). (4) Send the message M = w − n−k j=1 m j (mod n). For simplicity, assume that the origin is honest. Recall we assumed the distances are ∀i : l i = (k + 1 − i)(k − 1). In this section, we relax this requirement to l k ≤ k − 1, ∀i < k : l i ≤ l i+1 + k − 1.
Assume we have k ′ > 2 3
√ n adversaries, calculation shows that for every n > 4:
be integers such that ∀i : l i ≤ l i+1 + k − 1 and l k ≤ k − 1. Locate k adversaries along the ring within distances (l i ) k i=1 where l i denotes the distance between a i and a i+1 . Locate the rest of the k ′ − k adversaries arbitrarily and define them to behave honestly. Proof. Since l 1 = max i (l i ), for n − k − l 1 rounds all the adversaries behave like pipes. So after n − k − l 1 rounds, for every i, a i received and sent n − k − l 1 messages. Then, a 1 begins step 2. It sends k − 1 zeros. So a 2 received n − k − l 1 + k − 1 ≥ n − k − l 2 messages. Then a 2 begins step 2. Now a 2 sends k − 1 zeros, therefore a 3 begins step 2 and so on. Until a k completes step 2. After completing step 2, a k sent n − k − l k + k − 1 ≥ n − k messages. Therefore, a 1 receives a total of at least n − k messages, so it completes waiting in step 3, performs steps 4-5 and terminates. Then, a 2 receives n ≥ n − k messages, so it completes as well and then a 3 completes and so on. In the Cubic Attack, the first n − k incoming messages of each adversary processor a i are the secret values of the honest processors according to their order along the ring, that is secret
Proof. For each adversary a i , the first l i−1 incoming messages of a i are secret (I i−1 ). Its following l i−2 incoming messages are the first l i−2 outgoing messages of a i−1 which are the first l i−2 incoming messages of a i−1 , which are secret (I i−2 ) and so on. So the first n − k = k j=1 l i−j (mod k ) incoming messages of a i are secret (I i−1 ), secret (I i−2 ), secret (I i−3 ),..., secret (I i ). □ Notice that we implicitly used the fact that each adversary a i transfers its first n − k − l i incoming messages. A careful proof by explicit induction uses it. Proof. Consider the adversarial deviation described above. By Lemma 4.4, it is enough to show that all the honest processors terminate with output = t. Therefore, by Lemma 3.3, it is enough to show that for each adversary a i , the last l i outgoing messages of a i are the secret values of its honest segment I i , and that the total sum of its outgoing messages is t. By Lemma 4.5, the first n−k incoming messages of a i are secret (I i−1 ), secret (I i−2 ), secret (I i−3 ),..., secret (I i ). In particular, the last l i of them m n−k −l i +1 , ..., m n−k are secret (I i ). So the last l i outgoing messages of a i are the secret value of I i as required. More, let us calculate the sum of outgoing messages of a i . By definition, the sum is n−k−l i j=1 m j +(t −S )+ n−k j=n−k −l i +1 m j = t −S +S = t as required. □
Finally, we conjecture that A-LEAD uni is k-resilient for k = Ω( 3 √ n):
Conjecture 4.7. There exists a constant α > 1 8 , such that for every large enough n, A-LEAD uni is k-resilient for every k ≤ α 3 √ n.
RESILIENCE RESULTS FOR A-LEAD uni
In this section, we outline a proof that shows A-LEAD uni is ϵ-kresilient for ϵ = n −Ω( 4 n and ϵ ≥ n 3 n −k 0 .
The proof of Theorem 5.1 is in the full paper. Here we provide the intuition for three observations that are the main ingredients in the proof. Let C = (a 1 , ..., a k ), where a i ∈ [n] be an adversarial coalition of size k. For every adversarial coalition there exists an honest segment of length at least n−k k > 60k 3 . W.l.o.g. assume that a 1 precedes that honest segment of length l 1 ≥ 60k 3 .
The first observation is that at every time point, the total number of messages sent by two adversaries a i and a j is similar. We show that from the outgoing messages of every adversary, it should be possible to recover n − k secret values of the honest processors in order to pass all the validations. Since an adversary sends only a total of n messages, then it can send up to k spare messagesotherwise some adversary a i will not be able to send the last l i messages correctly. From this, we deduce that at every time point t, an adversary cannot send 2k messages more than it has received by time t. This implies that all adversaries are approximately synchronized, i.e., the difference between the total number of messages sent by a i and a j at any time is at most 2k 2 .
The second observation is that a 1 needs to send at least n − l 1 messages before it can obtain any information about d h 1 , where h 1 is the honest successor of a 1 . In order for information about d h 1 reach a 2 , a 1 must send at least l 1 messages. Then, in order for that information to travel from a i to a i+1 for every i, the adversary a 1 must send at least l i − 4k 2 more messages. Overall, a 1 sends at least n−4k 3 messages before any information about d h 1 reaches a 1 . From the selection of a 1 we have l 1 > 60k 3 , so n − 4k 3 > n − 60k 3 > n −l i and the observation is complete.
The third observation, which is a direct result of Lemma 3.3, is that when the adversary a 1 sends its (n − l 1 ) t h outgoing message it commits to all of its outgoing messages, since its last l 1 outgoing messages are predetermined to be the secret values of I 1 .
Combining the last two observations, we see that the only outgoing message of a 1 which depends on d h 1 is its last message, which must be d h 1 , therefore the sum of its outgoing messages distributes uniformly. So the output calculated by h 1 is distributes uniformly.
We conjecture that this resilience result is not tight. In the proof, we utilize a synchronization lemma, which states that all processors are synchronized up to 2k 2 messages. While this lemma is tight (processors indeed might be out of synchronization of order Θ(k 2 )), it cannot happen repeatedly in practice. However, we applied this lemma repeatedly in a conservative manner. As discussed before, A-LEAD uni simulates "rounds". In every round, each processor in its turn receives a data value and then sends the data value it received in the previous round. Let Sent t i be the number of messages a processor i sent until time t. Without adversaries, in A-LEAD uni we have for every time t, |Sent t i −Sent t j | ≤ 1. This means that all processors are "synchronized". The cubic attack utilizes the asynchronous nature of the network to take the honest processors out of synchronization. Specifically, in the cubic attack there exist an adversary a i and a time t, such that |Sent t i − Sent t 1 | = Ω(k 2 ) and the honest processors do not notice any deviation. The key observation that makes the attack possible is that this gap |Sent t i − Sent t 1 | is larger than the longest honest segment I 1 , therefore the adversary a 1 learns all the data values before committing, i.e., before sending n − l 1 messages. We modify the protocol A-LEAD uni by adding a "phase validation" mechanism that keeps all processors better synchronized. That is, we enforce the following property: for every processor i and time t, |Sent t i − Sent t 1 | = O (k ). The "phase validation" mechanism works as follows: Each processor i selects a secret validation value v i ∈ [m] uniformly (define m = 2n 2 ). In round i, processor i is the current round validator, and send v i . All the other processors transfer the validation value v i along the ring without delay. Then, the round's validator validates that the validation value it receives is indeed the same one it selected.
The random secret values in A-LEAD uni are denoted by {d i } n i=1 , and we call them data values. The output in A-LEAD uni is defined to be n i=1 d i (mod n). Recall the point of commitment of adversary a j : when an adversary a j sends its n − l j outgoing message. After the point of commitment, the adversary a j is obligated to send the data values of the honest segment I j and therefore cannot affect its outgoing messages anymore. In A-LEAD uni , as seen in Theorem 5.1, there exists an adversary that cannot find out the sum of the data values, S := h C d h (mod n), before sending too many messages. Therefore, it commits to its outgoing messages before being able to bias the output.
In PhaseAsyncLead every processor receives alternately a message from the original protocol A-LEAD uni , carrying a data value, and a message from the phase validation mechanism, carrying a validation value. Therefore, each processor treats all the odd incoming messages (first, third, etc.) as data messages and all the even incoming messages (second, fourth, etc.) as validation messages.
While the phase validation mechanism described above keeps all the processors synchronized, adding it to A-LEAD uni makes it nonresilient even to k = 4 adversaries. The adversaries can abuse the validation messages to share partial sums of S = h C d h (mod n) quickly and thus control the outcome. We give a full explanation of such an attack in the full paper. We solve this problem by substituting the "sum" function with a random function f , so adversaries cannot calculate useful partial information about the input.
The resilience proof of PhaseAsyncLead relies on the disability of adversaries to transfer enough information before committing. Due to the difficulty in separating information about data values from information about validation values, we apply f not only on the data values, but also on some of the validation values. We choose the inputs to f such that an adversary commits to them before being able to bias f by manipulating them. After sending n − l i data messages, a i is committed to all of its outgoing data messages, however it could still manipulate its last l i outgoing validation messages. Therefore, we apply f only on the first n − l validation messages where l ≤ n k ≤ max j {l j } = l j 0 (later we also lower bound l). This way, a j 0 is committed to all of its outgoing messages that affect the output after sending only n − l messages. Intuitively, after n −l rounds an adversary can collect (n −l ) honest validation values and information about (n − l + 2k ) data values, since it can abuse k validation values to collect information about data values. We want this to be less than all the information that goes into f . The total information that goes into f is (n−l )+(n−k ), so we want (n−l )+(n− l + 2k ) < (n −l ) + (n −k ), therefore we need l > 3k. Combining this inequality with l ≤ n k we deduce that we need k = O ( √ n) and then we select l = Θ( √ n). To conclude, we define f :
to be a fixed random function and the output calculated by processor
We define l := ⌈10 √ n⌉, because then for k < 1 10 √ n there exists an honest segment of length at least l. Assume w.l.o.g that l 1 ≥ l, i.e., a 1 precedes a long segment. So as soon as a 1 sends n − l messages, it is committed to the output.
Recall that A-LEAD uni is composed from a scheme that relies on secret sharing sub-protocol that shares {d i } n i=1 . PhaseAsyncLead is composed of a similar scheme which relies on a stronger secret sharing sub-protocol: Each processor i, selects secrets d i ∈ [n] and v i ∈ [m] uniformly. Then, using a secret sharing sub-protocol, all processors share the data values and the validation values
with each other, such that each processor i gets the valuesd i,1 andd i,2 , ...d i,n ,v i,1 ,v i,2 , ...v i,n wherev i, j = v j andd i, j = d j for all j. Then, each processor i validates locally its identities, i.e., ifd i,i d i orv i,i v i then it aborts by terminating with output i = ⊥. Finally, each processor i terminates with
As in A-LEAD uni , processor 1 is called oriдin and the rest of the processors are called normal processors. For notation simplicity, we assume the processors are located in an ascending order along the ring 1, . . . , n, however, our protocol and resilience proof can be modified to cope with generally located processors.
Algorithm: Secret sharing for PhaseAsyncLead , shares the values {d i } n i=1 and {v i } n i=1 1 Code for a normal processor i: 2 Initially,d i,i := d i 3 for j = 1 to n do 4 Wait to receive a data messaged i,i−j (mod n) and then send the previous data messaged i,i−j+1 (mod n) . 5 if j i then 6 wait for an incoming validation messagev i, j and forward it immediately. 7 else 8 perform validation by sending v i and waiting to receive it. 9 Code for oriдin: 10 Initially,d 1,1 := d 1 11 for j = 1 to n do 12 Sendd 1,n−j+2 (mod n) and then wait to receive a data messaged 1,n−j+1 (mod n) 13 if j 1 then 14 forward an incoming validation messagev 1, j 15 else 16 perform validation by sending v 1 and waiting to receive it. 17 send the last incoming data messaged 1,n−j (mod n)
Next, is our main result. 
Proof outline
As in Section 5, we perform the following simplifications w.l.o.g: Consider only deterministic deviations and notice the message schedule has no impact over the calculations. We show that with high probability over f , Pr (outcome = 1) < 1 n + ϵ. For deviations from PhaseAsyncLead , the input space is χ := [n] n−k × [m] n−k (recall that m := 2n 2 ). For a deviation D, denote by NoFail D the inputs for which every honest processor h terminate with a valid output, output h ⊥, i.e., inputs for every honest
For every processor b, for every integer 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n, denote by send (b, i) the event that b sends its i t h outgoing message. For every honest processor h, denote by s (h) = send (h, 2h) the event that h sends its validation message as the validator. Denote by r (h) = send (h − 1, 2h) the event that its predecessor, h − 1, sends a message which is interpreted by h asv h,h (so is expected to be equal to v h ). Define the event nr := send (a 1 , 2(n − l )) be the point of commitment of a 1 . Notice that after the event nr occurs, a 1 is committed, i.e., it already sent all the messages that affect the output as it is calculated by processors in I 1 , except for the data values of I 1 which are predetermined anyway.
We write α β if the event α happens before the event β for every message schedule (this is an intuitive definition, in the full proof we give an equivalent, however more useful definition for this notation). Given a deviation, an input and an event α, denote by data(α ) its value. An honest processor is unvalidated if data(s (h)) is not used to calculate data(r (h)) -for example, it holds when s (h) ̸ r (h). I.e., when r (h) might happen before s (h) (in the full proof we give an equivalent definition for this notation as well).
Proof outline for Theorem 6.1. In this proof, we call an adversarial deviation a "deviation". For each deviation, we partition the inputs space χ into three disjoint sets:
Intuitively, the first set χ D 1 , contains inputs for which the adversaries break synchronization severely before the event nr occurs. Denote M 0 = 2(n − l + 4k + 2). In an honest execution (no adversaries), we have the following linear order over the events s (1)
. Given a deviation, we say the synchronization is broken severely by an input, if there exists an adversary a i for which send (a i , M 0 ) nr . Next, we analyze the validation mechanism and show that when the linear order noted above does not hold, honest processors tend to be unvalidated. Leveraging these insights, we show that for inputs that break synchronization severely, there are at least k + 1 unvalidated honest processors. When an unvalidated processor is the round's validator, the adversaries "guess" the validation value because data(r (h)) is calculated independently of data(s (h)). From that, we deduce that Pr (NoFail D | χ D 1 ) ≤ 1 n . Note that while the existence of a single unvalidated processor is enough for the explanation above, in the full proof we need k + 1 of them due to deeper reasons.
The second set, χ D 2 , contains inputs for which the first 2(n − l ) outgoing messages of a 1 are not informative enough. For such inputs the adversaries are unlikely to reconstruct correctly the data values and the validation values in order for all the validations to succeed (namely, they need the following equalities to holdd i,i = d i andv i,i = v i ) and therefore the honest processors are likely to abort. More specifically, we get Pr (NoFail D | χ D 2 ) ≤ 1 n . The set χ D 3 includes the rest of the inputs. Notice that a deviation is defined by 2nk decision functions, that each receives a history (a list of incoming messages) and returns a list (possibly empty) of messages to send.
We partition all the deterministic deviations into equivalence classes [ · ] ≈ according the first M 0 decision functions of each adversary. Intuitively, two deviations are equivalent if their behavior during the first 1 2 M 0 rounds is identical. Next, we see that the behavior of the deviation over inputs in χ D 3 until the point of commitment nr is determined by the equivalence class of D . From that we deduce that Pr (outcome = 1 | χ D 3 ) > 1 n +ϵ implies a bias property over the class [D] ≈ . Since f is random and since the first 2(n − l ) outgoing messages of a 1 have many different options (by definition χ D 3 ∩ χ D 2 = ∅, so they are "informative"), we deduce that the probability for that bias property to hold is low, by using a Hoeffding's concentration inequality. Then, applying a union bound over the equivalence classes we get that for a random f it is likely that all classes do not have that bias property, which implies that Pr (outcome = 1 | χ D 3 ) < 1 n + ϵ for every deviation D. From the law of total probability over {χ D i } i we get that for every D: Pr (outcome = 1) ≤ 1 n + ϵ. □ Full details and and proofs for PhaseAsyncLead are available in the full paper.
RESILIENCE IMPOSSIBILITY FOR GRAPHS WHICH ARE SIMULATED BY TREES
Abraham et al. [4] proved that for any graph there is no ϵ-k-resilient FLE protocol for k ≥ 1 2 n. In this section we generalize the result to graphs that can be simulated by a tree, where each node in the tree simulates at most k processors. This is a generalization since every graph can be simulated by a tree of size 2, where each node in the tree simulates at most ⌈ 1 2 n⌉ processors. Note that requiring f to be a homomorphism means {( f (x ), f (y)) | (x, y) ∈ E} ⊆ E T . The mapping f can be viewed as a partition of the vertices of G to sets of size at most k, such that each part is connected and the induced graph over the partition constitutes a tree.
We show (in the full paper) that for any such graph, there exists a coalition of size at most k (which is mapped to a single vertex in the simulating tree) that can bias the outcome. Theorem 7.2. For every k-simulated tree, there is no ϵ-k-resilient FLE protocol for every ϵ ≤ 1 n .
CONCLUSION
We analyzed A-LEAD uni and showed that is resilient to Θ( 4 √ n) adversaries, and that it is not resilient to Θ( 3 √ n) adversaries. In the construction of the Θ( 3 √ n) adversaries attack, we locate the adversaries at increasing distances, to optimize the ability of adversaries to rush the information forward. In the resilience proof, we utilized a synchronization lemma, which states that at any time, different adversaries send a similar number of messages. The exact resilience of the A-LEAD uni remains as an open problem, and we conjecture that A-LEAD uni is actually resilient to Θ( 3 √ n) adversaries.
In order to enforce synchronization in A-LEAD uni , we modified it by adding a validated synchronization mechanism and used a random function to calculate the output, instead of a sum. The synchronization mechanism forces all the adversaries to send the same amount of messages at every time point. Namely, it provides an improved synchronization lemma. The random function prevents the adversaries from compressing the information required to bias the output. So it prevents them from utilizing the synchronization mechanism to cheat by calculating partial sums.
We give a tight resilience Θ( √ n) bound for our modified protocol, PhaseAsyncLead . While the attack is similar to the previous simpler attack (with Θ( √ n) adversaries), our resilience proof is involved.
Interestingly, most of the resilience proof focuses on the improved synchronization lemma. We successfully analyzed the resilience of specific protocols, however, the optimal resilience bound is still an open problem. The only general lower bound for a ring is n 2 adversaries [4] . We derived an algorithm that can overcome Θ( √ n) adversaries. Closing this large gap, either by improving the general lower bound or by composing a better protocol, would be of great interest. Our model assumes that the set of ids is known to all the processors prior to the execution of the protocol, however in other models they are not known. The obvious solution is adding a renaming phase. However, it raises a potentially significant problem. The problem is that some honest segments might complete the renaming phase, and enter the leader lection protocol, before others. In such a case, adversarial processors might leverage the renaming phase in order to transfer information about the execution of the actual leader election protocol. This requires extending our resilience proofs to consider also a renaming phase, which is very plausible but leave it as an open problem.
